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Rank-Deficient Solutions for Optimal Signaling
over Wiretap MIMO Channels
Sergey Loyka, Charalambos D. Charalambous
Abstract
Capacity-achieving signaling strategies for the Gaussian wiretap MIMO channel are investigated
without the degradedness assumption. In addition to known solutions, a number of new rank-deficient
solutions for the optimal transmit covariance matrix are obtained. The case of a weak eavesdropper is
considered in detail and the optimal covariance is established in an explicit, closed form with no extra
assumptions. This provides lower and upper bounds to the secrecy capacity in the general case with a
bounded gap, which are tight for a weak eavesdropper or/and low SNR. Closed form solutions are also
obtained for isotropic and omnidirectional eavesdroppers, based on which lower and upper bounds to the
secrecy capacity are established in the general case. Sufficient and necessary conditions for optimality
of 3 popular transmission techniques, namely the zero-forcing (ZF), the standard water-filling (WF) over
the channel eigenmodes and the isotropic signaling (IS), are established for the MIMO wiretap channel.
These solutions are appealing due to their lower complexity. In particular, no wiretap codes are needed
for the ZF transmission, and no precoding or feedback is needed for the isotropic signaling.
Index Terms
MIMO, wiretap channel, secrecy capacity, optimal signalling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Widespread use of wireless systems on one hand and their broadcast nature on the other have
initiated significant interest in their security. Information-theoretic studies of the secrecy aspects
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2of wireless systems have recently attracted significant interest [1]. Due to the high spectral
efficiency of wireless MIMO systems and their wide adoption by the academia and industry,
the Gaussian MIMO wire-tap channel (WTC) has emerged as a popular model and a number
of results have been obtained for this model, including the proof of optimality of the Gaussian
signaling [1]-[4].
An optimal transmit covariance matrix under the total power constraint has been obtained for
some special cases (low/high SNR, MISO channels, full-rank or rank-1 solutions) [2]-[7], but the
general case remains elusive. The main difficulty lies in the fact that, unlike the regular MIMO
channel, the underlying optimization problem for the MIMO-WTC is generally not convex. It
was conjectured in [4] and proved in [3] using an indirect approach (via a degraded channel)
that the optimal signaling is on the positive directions of the difference channel. A direct proof
(based on the necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions) has been obtained
in [6], while the optimality of signaling on non-negative directions has been established in [7]
via an indirect approach. Closed form solutions for MISO and rank-1 MIMO channels have
been obtained in [2][6]-[8]. The 2-2-1 channel (2 transmit, 2 receive, 1 eavesdropper antenna)
has been studied earlier in [5]. The low-SNR regime has been studied in detail in [9]. An exact
full-rank solution for the optimal covariance and several of its properties have been obtained in
[6]. In particular, unlike the regular channel (no eavesdropper), the optimal power allocation does
not converge to the uniform one at high SNR and the latter remains sub-optimal at any finite
SNR. In the case of a weak eavesdropper, the optimal signaling mimics the conventional one
(water-filling over the channel eigenmodes) with an adjustment for the eavesdropper channel.
Finally, while no analytical solution for the optimal covariance is known in the general
case, numerical algorithms have been developed to attack the problem in [10]-[13], which
however suffer from the lack of provable global convergence due to the non-convex nature
of the optimization problem in the general case. A globally-convergent numerical algorithm for
the general case, which is based on an equivalent min-max reformulation of the original problem,
was proposed in [14] and its convergence was proved, which takes only a moderate or small
number of steps in practice.
The present paper extends the known analytical results for the optimal covariance in several
directions. First, motivated by a scenario where the legitimate receiver (Rx) is closer to the
transmitter (Tx) than the eavesdropper, the case of a weak eavesdropper is studied and its optimal
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3covariance is obtained in an explicit closed form without any extra assumptions in Section III.
It provides novel lower and upper bounds to the secrecy capacity in the general case with a
bounded gap, which are tight when the eavesdropper is weak or/and the SNR is low and hence
serve as an approximation to the true capacity. It also captures the capacity saturation effect at
high SNR observed in [3][6]. The range of validity of this model is indicated.
The presence of the eavesdropper channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter is in
question when the eavesdropper does not cooperate (e.g. to hide its presence). To address this
issue, we consider in Section IV an isotropic eavesdropper model, whereby the Tx does not
know the directional properties of the eavesdropper and hence assumes it is isotropic, i.e. the
eavesdropper channel gain is the same in all directions. The secrecy capacity as well as an optimal
signaling to achieve it and its properties are established in an explicit closed form. This case is
shown to be the worst-case MIMO wire-tap channel. Based on this, lower and upper capacity
bounds are obtained for the general case, which are achievable by the isotropic eavesdropper.
The properties of the optimal power allocation are pointed out.
The case of isotropic eavesdropper above requires the number of its antennas to be not less
than the number of Tx antennas (which is necessary for a full-rank eavesdropper channel), which
may not be the case in practice. To address this issue, Section V studies an omnidirectional
eavesdropper, which may have a smaller number of antennas (and hence rank-deficient channel)
and which has the same gain in any direction of a given subspace. The secrecy capacity and the
optimal signaling are established in a closed form.
The case of identical right singular vectors of the Rx and eavesdropper channels is investigated
and the optimal covariance is established in a closed from in Section VI. This case is motivated
by a scenario where the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are spatially separated so that
each has its own set of local scatterers inducing its own left singular vectors (SV), while both
channel are subject to the same set of scatterers around the transmitter (e.g. a base station) and
hence the same right SVs. This is similar to the popular Kronecker MIMO channel correlation
model, see e.g. [15], where the overall channel correlation is a product of the independent Tx
and Rx parts, which are induced by the respective sets of scatterers.
In Section VII, the conditions for optimality of popular zero-forcing (ZF) signaling are
established, whereby the Tx antenna array forms a null in the eavesdropper direction. Under
those conditions, the standard eigenmode signaling and the water-filling (WF) power allocation
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4on what remains of the required channel (after the ZF) are optimal. Furthermore, no wiretap codes
are required as regular coding on the required channel suffices, so that the secrecy requirement
imposes no extra complexity penalty (beyond the standard ZF). In this case, the optimal secure
signaling is decomposed into two parts: part 1 is the ZF (null forming in the terminology of
antenna array literature [16]), which ensures the secrecy requirement, and part 2 is the standard
signaling (eigenmode transmission, WF power allocation and coding) on the required channel,
which maximizes the rate of required transmission. This is reminiscent of the classical source-
channel coding separation [17].
In Sections VIII and IX, we consider two other popular signaling techniques: the standard
water-filling over the eigenmodes of the legitimate channel and the isotropic signaling (IS,
whereby the covariance matrix is a scaled identity) and establish sufficient and necessary condi-
tions under which they are optimal for the MIMO WTC. These techniques are also appealing due
to a number of reasons. While the standard WF does require wiretap codes, standard solutions
can be used for power allocation and eigenmode transmission (i.e. spatial modulation); the
isotropic signaling is appealing due to its low complexity: no eavesdropper CSI is required at
the transmitter as independent, identically distributed data streams are launched by each antenna.
The set of channels for which the isotropic signaling is optimal is fully characterized in Section
IX. It turns out to be much richer than that of the conventional (no eavesdropper) MIMO channel.
Notations: Lower case bold letters denote vectors while bold capitals denote matrices. λi(W)
denotes the eigenvalues of a matrix W in decreasing order unless indicated otherwise; (x)+ =
max{x, 0} for a scalar x; N (W) and R(W) are the null space and the range of a matrix W;
(W)+ denotes the positive eigenmodes of a Hermitian matrix W:
(W)+ =
∑
i:λi(W)>0
λiuiu
†
i (1)
where ui is i-th eigenvector of W; trW and |W| denote the trace and the determinant of W;
W† is the Hermitian conjugation of W.
II. WIRE-TAP GAUSSIAN MIMO CHANNEL MODEL
Let us consider the standard wire-tap Gaussian MIMO channel model,
y1 = H1x+ ξ1, y2 = H2x+ ξ2 (2)
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5where x = [x1, x2, ...xm]T ∈ Cm,1 is the transmitted complex-valued signal vector of dimension
m × 1, “T” denotes transposition, yk ∈ Cnk , k = 1, 2, are the received vectors at the receiver
and eavesdropper, ξ1 and ξ2 are the circularly-symmetric additive white Gaussian noise at the
receiver and eavesdropper (normalized to unit variance in each dimension), Hk ∈ Cnk,m is the
nk ×m matrix of the complex channel gains between each Tx and each receive (eavesdropper)
antenna, n1, n2 and m are the numbers of Rx, eavesdropper and Tx antennas respectively. The
channels Hk are assumed to be quasistatic (i.e., constant for a sufficiently long period of time
so that the infinite horizon information theory assumption holds) and frequency-flat, with full
channel state information (CSI) at the Rx and Tx ends.
For a given transmit covariance matrix R = E
{
xx†
}
, where E {·} is the statistical expecta-
tion, the maximum achievable secrecy rate between the Tx and Rx (so that the rate between the
Tx and the eavesdropper is zero) is [3][4]
C(R) = ln
|I+W1R|
|I+W2R| = C1(R)− C2(R) (3)
where Ck(R) = ln |I+WkR|, k = 1, 2, negative C(R) is interpreted as zero rate, Wk = H†kHk,
and the secrecy capacity subject to the total Tx power constraint is
Cs = max
R≥0
C(R) s.t. trR ≤ PT (4)
where PT is the total transmit power (also the SNR since the noise is normalized). It is well-
known that the problem in (4) is not convex in general and explicit solutions for the optimal Tx
covariance are not known for the general case, but only for some special cases (e.g. low/high
SNR, MISO channels, full-rank or rank-1 case [2]-[6]).
III. WEAK EAVESDROPPER AND CAPACITY BOUNDS
In this section, we obtain novel lower and upper bounds to the secrecy capacity in the general
case and show that the bounds are tight when the eavesdropper is weak or if the SNR is low. The
weak eavesdropper case is motivated by a scenario where the eavesdropper is located far away
from the Tx so that its propagation path loss is large, see e.g. Fig. 2. This is the case when the
presence of the eavesdropper does not result in a large capacity loss so that the physical-layer
secrecy approach is feasible (while in the case of a strong eavesdropper, the capacity loss is
large and other approaches may be preferable, e.g. cryptography). There is no requirement here
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6for the channel to be degraded or for the optimal covariance to be of full rank or rank 1, so that
these results extend the known closed form solutions.
To this end, let
Cw(R) = ln |I+W1R| − tr(W2R)
Cw = max
R
Cw(R) (5)
R∗ = argmax
R
C(R), R∗w = argmax
R
Cw(R)
all subject to R ≥ 0, trR ≤ PT , i.e. R∗ is the optimal covariance and R∗w maximizes Cw(R).
Using ln(1 + x) ≈ x when 0 ≤ x ≪ 1, it can been seen that Cw(R) is a weak eavesdropper
approximation of C(R):
C(R) ≈ Cw(R) if λ1(W2R)≪ 1 (6)
so that Cw is the weak eavesdropper secrecy capacity. The following Theorem establishes novel
secrecy capacity bounds based on Cw.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity Cs in (4) for the general Gaussian MIMO-WTC in (2) is
bounded as follows:
Cw ≤ C(R∗w) ≤ Cs ≤ Cw +
P 2T
2
λ21(W2) (7)
where
R∗w = Q
1/2(I− Ŵ−11 )+Q1/2 (8)
Ŵ1 = Q
1/2W1Q
1/2 (9)
and Q is the (Moore-Penrose) pseudo-inverse of Wλ = λI+W2; λ ≥ 0 is found from the total
power constraint:
trR∗w = PT if PT < P ∗T (10)
and λ = 0 otherwise; the threshold power
P ∗T = trW
−1
2 (I−W1/22 W−11 W1/22 )+ (11)
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7if W2 is non-singular. When W2 is singular, P ∗T = ∞ if N (W2) * N (W1); otherwise, W1
and W2 are projected orthogonally to N (W2) and the projected matrices are used in (11). The
weak eavesdropper secrecy capacity can be expressed as
Cw =
∑
i:λ̂1i>1
ln λ̂1i − trŴ2(I− Ŵ−11 )+ (12)
where λ̂1i = λi(Ŵ1), Ŵ2 = Q1/2W2Q1/2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 1. It may appear that (8) requires Ŵ1 and thus W1 to be positive definite, i.e. singular
case is not allowed. This is not so since (·)+ operator eliminates singular eigenmodes of Ŵ1
so that (I − Ŵ−11 )+ is well-defined even if W1 is singular: one can use Ŵ1δ = Ŵ1 + δI > 0
instead of Ŵ1, where δ > 0, evaluate (I − Ŵ−11δ )+ and take the limit δ → 0 to see that the
singular modes of Ŵ1 are eliminated so that
(I− Ŵ−11 )+ = U+DU†+ (13)
where U+ is a semi-unitary matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of Ŵ1 corresponding to
its positive eigenvalues,D is a r×r diagonal matrix whose i-th diagonal entry is (1−λ−1i (Ŵ1))+,
i = 1...r, where r is the rank of Ŵ1. The same observation also applies to (11).
Remark 2. The 1st inequality in (7) bounds the sub-optimality gap of using R∗w, for which an
achievable rate is C(R∗w), instead of the true optimal covariance R∗:
|Cs − C(R∗w)| ≤ λ21(W2)P 2T/2 (14)
so that C(R∗w)→ Cs as λ1(W2)PT → 0.
Using Theorem 1, we can now approximate the secrecy capacity via its weak eavesdropper
counterpart.
Corollary 1. The secrecy capacity of the general Gaussian MIMO-WTC can be expressed as
follows:
Cs = Cw +∆C (15)
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8where ∆C is the inaccuracy of the weak eavesdropper approximation, which is bounded as
0 ≤ ∆C ≤ λ21(W2)P 2T/2 (16)
so that ∆C → 0 and Cs/Cw → 1 as PT → 0 or/and λ1(W2)→ 0.
Proof: (15) and (16) follow from the bounds in (7), which also implies ∆C → 0 as
PTλ1(W2)→ 0. To show that Cs/Cw → 1 as PT → 0 observe that
Cs = PTλ1(W1 −W2) + o(PT ) = Cw + o(PT )
from which the desired result follows (here, we implicitly assume that λ1(W1 −W2) > 0;
otherwise, Cs = 0 and there is nothing to prove). When λ1(W2) → 0, note that both C(R)
and Cw(R) converge to ln |I +W1R| so that taking maxR results in Cs/Cw → 1 (since the
objectives are continuous and the feasible set is compact).
Using this Corollary, the secrecy capacity can be approximated as
Cs ≈ Cw (17)
and the approximation is accurate for a weak eavesdropper or/and low SNR: λ1(W2)PT ≪ 1,
when the bounds in (7) are also tight, see Fig. 1.
Remark 3. Since λ1(W2R) ≤ λ1(W2)λ1(R) ≤ PTλ1(W2), one way to ensure that the
eavesdropper is weak, i.e. λ1(W2R) ≪ 1 so that ln |I + W2R| ≈ trW2R, is to require
λ1(W2)≪ 1/PT from which it follows that this holds as long as the power (or SNR) is not too
large, i.e. PT ≪ 1/λ1(W2); see also Fig. 1. It should be noted, however, that the approximation
in (17) extends well beyond the low-SNR regime provided that the eavesdropper propagation
path loss is sufficiently large (i.e. λ1(W2) is small). For the scenario in Fig. 1, it works well up
to about 10 dB and this can extend to larger SNR for smaller path loss factor α.
To illustrate Theorem 1 and Corrolary 1 and also to see how accurate the approximation is,
Fig. 1 shows the secrecy capacity obtained from the approximation in (17) for
W1 =
 2 0
0 1
 , W2 = α
 2 1
1 1
 , (18)
also, its exact values (without the weak eavesdropper approximation) obtained by brute force
Monte-Carlo (MC) based approach (where a large number of covariance matrices are randomly
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 1. Weak eavesdropper approximation in (17) and exact secrecy capacity (via MC) versus SNR. W1 and W2 are as in
(18), α = 0.1, λ1(W2) ≈ 0.25. The approximation is accurate if SNR < 10 dB. Note the capacity saturation effect at high
SNR in both cases.
generated, subject to the total power constraint, and the best one is selected) are shown for
comparison. To validate the analytical solution for Cw in Theorem 1, the weak eavesdropper
case has also been solved by the MC-based approach. It is clear that the approximation Cs ≈ Cw
is accurate for the channel in (18) provided that SNR < 10 dB. Also note the capacity saturation
effect, for both the approximate and exact values. This saturation effect has been already observed
in [3][6] and, in the case of W1 >W2 > 0, the saturation capacity is
C∗s = ln |W1| − ln |W2| (19)
which follows directly from (3) by neglecting I. In the weak eavesdropper approximation, the
saturation effect is due to the fact that the 2nd term in (5) is linear in PT while the 1st one
is only logarithmic, so that using the full available power is not optimal when it is sufficiently
high. Roughly, the approximation is accurate before it reaches the saturation point, i.e. for
PT < P
∗
T . The respective saturation capacity is obtained from (12) by setting λ = 0. In the case
of W1 >W2 > 0, it is given by
Cw = ln |W1| − ln |W2| − tr(I−W2W−11 ) (20)
By comparing (19) and (20), one concludes that the thresholds are close to each other when
trW2W
−1
1 ≈ m.
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To obtain further insight in the weak eavesdropper regime, let us consider the case when W1
and W2 have the same eigenvectors. This is a broader case than it may first appear as it requires
H1 and H2 to have the same right singular vectors while leaving left ones unconstrained (see
Section VI for more details on this scenario). In this case, the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary
1 simplify as follows.
Corollary 2. Under the weak eavesdropper condition λ1(W2)≪ 1/PT and when W1 and W2
have the same eigenvectors, the optimal covariance is
R∗ ≈ R∗w = UΛ∗U† (21)
where U is found from the eigenvalue decompositions Wi = UΛiU† so that the eigenvectors
of R∗w are the same as those of W1 and W2. The diagonal matrix Λ∗ collects the eigenvalues
of R∗w:
λi(R
∗
w) =
(
1
λ+ λ2i
− 1
λ1i
)
+
(22)
where λki is i-th eigenvalue of Wk.
Proof: Using Wi = UΛiU† in (8) results in (21) and (22).
Note that the power allocation in (22) resembles that of the standard water filling, except for
the λ2i term. In particular, only sufficiently strong eigenmodes are active:
λi(R
∗
w) > 0 iff λ1i > λ+ λ2i (23)
As PT increases, λ decreases so that more eigenmodes become active; the legitimate channel
eigenmodes are active provided that they are stronger that those of the eavesdropper: λ1i > λ2i.
Only the strongest eigenmode (for which the difference λ1i−λ2i is largest) is active at low SNR.
IV. ISOTROPIC EAVESDROPPER AND CAPACITY BOUNDS
The model in Section III requires the full eavesdropper CSI at the transmitter. This becomes
questionable if the eavesdropper does not cooperate (e.g. when it is hidden in order not to
compromise its eavesdropping ability). One approach to address this issue is via a compound
channel model [23]-[25]. An alternative approach is considered here, where the eavesdropper is
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
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characterized by its channel gain identical in all directions, which we term ”isotropic eavesdrop-
per”. This minimizes the amount of CSI available at the transmitter (one scalar parameter and
no directional properties).
A further physical justification for this model comes from an assumption that the eavesdropper
cannot approach the transmitter too closely due to e.g. some minimum protection distance, see
Fig. 2. This ensures that the gain of the eavesdropper channel does not exceed a certain threshold
in any transmit direction due to the minimum propagation path loss (induced by the minimum
distance constraint). Since the channel power gain in transmit direction u is u†W2u = |H2u|2
(assuming |u| = 1) and since max|u|=1 u†W2u = ǫ1 (from the variational characterization
of eigenvalues [21]), where ǫ1 is the largest eigenvalue of W2, W2 ≤ ǫ1I ensures that the
eavesdropper channel power gain does not exceed ǫ1 in any direction.
In combination with matrix monotonicity of the log-det function, the latter inequality ensures
that ǫ1I is the worst possible W2 that results in the smallest capacity (the lower bound in (27)),
i.e. the isotropic eavesdropper with the maximum channel gain is the worst possible one among
all eavesdroppers with a bounded spectral norm. Referring to Fig. 2, the eavesdropper channel
matrix H2 can be presented in the following form:
H2 =
√
αR−ν2 H˜2 (24)
where αR−ν2 represents the average propagation path loss, R2 is the eavesdropper-transmitter
distance, ν is the path loss exponent (which depends on the propagation environment), α is a
constant independent of distance (but dependent on frequency, antenna height, etc.) [27] , and H˜2
is a properly normalized channel matrix (includes local scattering/multipath effects but excludes
the average path loss) so that tr H˜†2H˜2 ≤ n2m [28]. With this in mind, one obtains:
W2 = H
†
2H2 =
α
Rν2
H˜
†
2H˜2 ≤
α
Rν2min
H˜
†
2H˜2 ≤
αn2m
Rν2min
I (25)
so that one can take ǫ1 = αn2mR−ν2min in this scenario, where R2min is the minimum transmitter-
eavesdropper distance. Note that the model captures the impact of the number of transmit and
eavesdropper antennas, in addition to the minimum distance and propagation environment. In
our view, the isotropic eavesdropper model is more practical than the full Tx CSI model.
The isotropic eavesdropper model is closely related to the parallel channel setting in [19][20]:
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 2. Physical scenario for a secret communication system: base station BS (the transmitter) is located on the rooftop of a
secure building B, legitimate user U (the receiver) is inside the building B, and eavesdropper E is beyond the fence so that
R2 ≥ R2min.
even though the original channel is not parallel, it can be transformed into a parallel channel1,
for which independent signaling is known to be optimal [19][20]. This shows that signaling on
the eigenvectors of W1 is optimal in this case while an optimal power allocation is different
from the standard water filling [20]. These properties in combination with the bounds in (26)
are exploited below.
While it is a challenging analytical task to evaluate the secrecy capacity in the general case,
one can use the isotropic eavesdropper model above to construct lower and upper capacity bounds
for the general case using the standard matrix inequalities,
ǫmI ≤W2 ≤ ǫ1I (26)
where ǫi = λi(W2) denotes i-th largest eigenvalue of W2, and the equalities are achieved when
ǫ1 = ǫm, i.e. by the isotropic eavesdropper. This is formalized below.
Proposition 1. The secrecy capacity of the general MIMO-WTC in (4) is bounded as follows:
C∗(ǫ1) ≤ Cs ≤ C∗(ǫm) (27)
1via an information-preserving transformation: using a unitary transmit pre-coding with the unitary matrix whose columns are
the eigenvectors of W1 and unitary post-codings at the receiver and eavesdropper with unitary matrices whose columns are the
left singular vectors of H1 and H2 respectively.
October 30, 2018
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where C∗(ǫ) is the secrecy capacity if the eavesdropper were isotropic, i.e. under W2 = ǫI,
C∗(ǫ) = max
R≥0, trR≤PT
ln
|I+W1R|
|I+ ǫR| =
∑
i
ln
1 + giλ
∗
i
1 + ǫλ∗i
(28)
gi = λi(W1), and λ∗i = λi(R∗) are the eigenvalues of the optimal transmit covariance R∗ =
U1Λ
∗U
†
1 under the isotropic eavesdropper,
λ∗i =
ǫ+ gi
2ǫgi
(√
1 +
4ǫgi
(ǫ+ gi)2
(
gi − ǫ
λ
− 1
)
+
− 1
)
(29)
and λ > 0 is found from the total power constraint ∑i λ∗i = PT .
The gap in the bounds of (27) is upper bounded as follows:
∆C = C∗(ǫm)− C∗(ǫ1) ≤ m+ ln 1 + ǫ1PT/m+
1 + ǫmPT/m+
≤ m+ ln ǫ1
ǫm
(30)
where m+ is the number of eigenmodes such that gi > ǫm. Both bounds are tight at high SNR
if gm+ > ǫ1.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, the optimal signaling for the isotropic eavesdropper case is on the eigenvectors of W1
(or right singular vectors of H1), identically to the regular MIMO channel, with the optimal
power allocation somewhat similar (but not identical) to the conventional water filling. The
latter is further elaborated below for the high and low SNR regimes. Unlike the general case
(of non-isotropic eavesdropper), the secrecy capacity of the isotropic eavesdropper case does not
depend on the eigenvectors of W1 (but the optimal signaling does), only on its eigenvalues, so
that the optimal signaling problem here separates into 2 independent parts: (i) optimal signaling
directions are selected as the eigenvectors of W1, and (ii) optimal power allocation is done based
on the eigenvalues of W1 and the eavesdropper channel gain ǫ. It is the lack of this separation
that makes the optimal signaling problem so difficult in the general case.
The bounds in (27) coincide when ǫ1 = ǫm thus giving the secrecy capacity of the isotropic
eavesdropper. Furthermore, as follows from (30), they are close to each other when the condition
number ǫ1/ǫm of W2 is not too large, thus providing a reasonable estimate of the capacity, see
Fig. 3. Referring to Fig. 2, one can also set ǫ1 = αn2mR−ν2min and proceed with a conservative
system design to achieve the secrecy rate C∗(ǫ1). Note that this design requires only the knowl-
edge of n2 and R2min at the transmitter, not full CSI (W2) and hence is more realistic. This
signaling strategy does not incur significant penalty (compared to the full CSI case) provided that
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
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the condition number ǫ1/ǫm is not large, as follows from (30). It can be further shown that C∗(ǫ1)
is the compound channel capacity for the class of eavesdroppers with bounded spectral norm
(maximum channel gain), W2 ≤ ǫ1I, and that signaling on the worst-case channel (W2 = ǫ1I)
achieves the capacity for the whole class of channels with W2 ≤ εI [25].
We note that the power allocation in (29) has properties similar to those of the conventional
water-filling, which follow from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Properties of the optimum power allocation in (29) for the isotropic eavesdropper:
1. λ∗i is an increasing function of gi (strictly increasing unless λ∗i = 0 or PT ) , i.e. stronger
eigenmodes get more power (as in the standard WF).
2. λ∗i is an increasing function of PT (strictly increasing unless λ∗i = 0). λ∗i = 0 for i > 1
and λ∗1 = PT as PT → 0 if g1 > g2, i.e. only the strongest eigenmode is active at low SNR, and
λ∗i > 0 if gi > ǫ as PT →∞, i.e. all sufficiently strong eigenmodes are active at high SNR.
3. λ∗i > 0 only if gi > ǫ, i.e. only the eigenmodes stronger than the eavesdropper ones can be
active.
4. λ is a strictly decreasing function of PT and 0 < λ < g1 − ǫ; λ → 0 as PT → ∞ and
λ→ g1 − ǫ as PT → 0.
5. There are m+ active eigenmodes if the following inequalities hold:
Pm+ < PT ≤ Pm++1 (31)
where Pm+ is a threshold power (to have at least m+ active eigenmodes):
Pm+ =
m+−1∑
i=1
ǫ+ gi
2ǫgi
(√
1 +
4ǫgi
(ǫ+ gi)2
gi − gm+
(gm+ − ǫ)+
− 1
)
, m+ = 2...m, (32)
and P1 = 0, so that m+ increases with PT .
It follows from Proposition 2 that there is only one active eigenmode, i.e. beamforming is
optimal, if g2 > ǫ and
PT ≤ ǫ+ g1
2ǫg1
(√
1 +
4ǫg1
(ǫ+ g1)2
g1 − g2
g2 − ǫ − 1
)
(33)
e.g. in the low SNR regime (note however that the single-mode regime extends well beyond low
SNR if ǫ→ g2 and g1 > g2), or at any SNR if g1 > ǫ and g2 ≤ ǫ.
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While it is difficult to evaluate λ analytically from the power constraint, Property 4 ensures
that any suitable numerical algorithm (e.g. Newton-Raphson method) will do so efficiently.
As a side benefit of Proposition 2, one can use (31) as a condition for having m+ active
eigenmodes under the regular eigenmode transmission (no eavesdropper) with the standard water-
filling by taking ǫ→ 0 in (32):
Pm+ =
m+−1∑
i=1
(
1
gm+
− 1
gi
)
(34)
and (34) approximates (32) when the eavesdropper is weak, ǫ ≪ gm+. To the best of our
knowledge, expression (34) for the threshold powers of the standard water-filling has not appeared
in the literature before.
A. High SNR regime
Let us now consider the isotropic eavesdropper model when the SNR grows large, so that
giλ
∗
i ≫ 1, ǫλ∗i ≫ 1. In this case, (28) simplifies to
C∗∞ =
∑
i:gi>ǫ
ln
gi
ǫ
(35)
where the summation is over active eigenmodes only, so that the capacity is independent of
the SNR (saturation effect) and the impact of the eavesdropper is the multiplicative SNR loss,
which is never negligible. To obtain a threshold value of PT at which the saturation takes place,
observe that λ→ 0 as PT →∞ so that (29) becomes
λ∗i = PT
√
ǫ−1 − g−1i /β(1 + o(1)) (36)
for i : gi > ǫ, where β =
∑
i:gi>ǫ
√
ǫ−1 − g−1i and
√
λ = βP−1T (1 + o(1)) from the total power
constraint. Using (36), the capacity becomes
C∗(ǫ) =
∑
i:gi>ǫ
ln
gi
ǫ
− β
2
PT
+ o
(
1
PT
)
(37)
which is a refinement of (35). The saturation takes place when the second term is much smaller
than the first one, so that
PT ≫ β2/
∑
i:gi>ǫ
ln
gi
ǫ
(38)
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and C∗(ǫ) ≈ C∗∞ under this condition. This effect in illustrated in Fig. 3. Note that, from (36), the
optimal power allocation behaves almost like water-filling in this case, due to the
√
ǫ−1 − g−1i
term.
Using (35), the gap ∆C∗∞ between the lower and upper bounds in (27) becomes
∆C∗∞ = C
∗
∞(ǫm)− C∗∞(ǫ1)
= m1 ln
ǫ1
ǫm
+
m2∑
i=m1+1
ln
gi
ǫm
(39)
where m1 and m2 are the numbers of active eigenmodes when ǫ = ǫ1 and ǫ = ǫm. Note that
this gap is SNR-independent and if m1 = m2 = m+, which is the case if gm+ > ǫ1, then
∆C∗∞ = m+ ln
ǫ1
ǫm
(40)
i.e. also independent of the eigenmode gains of the legitimate user and is determined solely by
the condition number of the eavesdropper channel and the number of active eigenmodes. Note
that, in this case, the upper bounds in (30) are tight.
10− 0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
0ε =
0.2ε =
0.1ε =
SNR [dB]
*( )C ε
high SNR
low SNR
Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity for the isotropic eavesdropper and the capacity of the regular MIMO channel (no eavesdropper, ǫ = 0)
vs. the SNR (= PT since the noise variance is unity); g1 = 2, g2 = 1. Note the saturation effect at high SNR , where the
capacity strongly depends on ǫ but not the SNR, and the negligible impact of the eavesdropper at low SNR.
B. When is the eavesdropper’s impact negligible?
It is clear from (28) that under fixed {gi} and PT , the secrecy capacity converges to the
conventional one C∗(0) as ǫ→ 0. However, no fixed ǫ (does not matter how small) can ensure
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by itself that the eavesdropper’s impact on the capacity is negligible since one can always select
sufficiently high PT to make the saturation effect important (see Fig. 3). To answer the question
in the section’s title, we use (28) to obtain:
C∗(ǫ) = max
{λi}
∑
i
ln
(
1 +
1 + (gi − ǫ)λi
1 + ǫλi
)
s.t. λi ≥ 0,
∑
i
λi = PT
(a)≈max
{λi}
∑
i
ln(1 + (gi − ǫ)λi) (41)
(b)≈max
{λi}
∑
i
ln(1 + giλi) = C
∗(0)
where (a) holds if
PT ≪ 1/ǫ (42)
(since λi ≤ PT ), i.e. if the SNR is not too large, and (b) holds if
ǫ≪ gi (43)
for all active eigenmodes, i.e. if the eavesdropper is much weaker than the legitimate active
eigenmodes. It is the combination of (42) and (43) that ensures that the eavesdropper’s impact
is negligible. Neither condition alone is able to do so. Fig. 3 illustrates this point. Eq. (41)
also indicates that the impact of the eavesdropper is the per-eigenmode gain loss of ǫ. Unlike
the high-SNR regime in (35) where the loss is multiplicative (i.e. very significant and never
negligible), here it is additive (mild or negligible in many cases).
C. Low SNR regime
Let us now consider the low-SNR regime, which is characteristic for CDMA-type systems
[26]. Traditionally, this regime is defined via PT → 0. We, however, use a more relaxed definition
requiring that m+ = 1, which holds under (33). In this regime, assuming g1 > ǫ,
C∗(ǫ) = ln
1 + g1PT
1 + ǫPT
= ln
(
1 +
(g1 − ǫ)PT
1 + ǫPT
)
(a)≈ ln(1 + (g1 − ǫ)PT ) (44)
where (a) holds when PT ≪ 1/ǫ. It is clear from the last expression that the impact of the
eavesdropper is an additive SNR loss of ǫPT , which is negligible when ǫ≪ g1. Note a significant
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difference to the high SNR regime in (35), where this impact is never negligible. Fig. 3 illustrates
this difference.
It follows from (44)(a) that the difference between the lower and upper bounds in (27) at
low SNR is the SNR gap of (ǫ1 − ǫm)PT . This difference is negligible if g1 ≫ ǫ1 − ǫm, which
may be the case even if the condition number ǫ1/ǫm is large (in which case the difference is
significant at high SNR, see (40)). Therefore, we conclude that the impact of the eavesdropper
is more pronounced in the high-SNR regime and is negligible in the low-SNR one if its channel
is weaker than the strongest eigenmode of the legitimate user, g1 ≫ ε1.
When g1 − ǫ≪ 1/PT , (44)(a) gives C∗(ǫ) ≈ (g1− ǫ)PT , i.e. linear in PT . A similar capacity
scaling at low SNR has been obtained in [29] for i.i.d. block-fading single-input single-output
(SISO) WTC, without however explicitly identifying the capacity but via establishing upper/lower
bounds. Also note that the 1st two equalities in (44) do not require PT → 0 but only to satisfy
(33).
V. OMNIDIRECTIONAL EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we consider a scenario where the eavesdropper has equal gain in all directions
of a certain subspace. This model accounts for 2 points: (i) when the transmitter has no particular
knowledge about the directional properties of the eavesdropper, which is most likely from the
practical perspective, it is reasonable to assume that its gain is the same in all directions; (ii) on
the other hand, when the eavesdropper has a small number of antennas (less than the number of
transmit antennas), its channel rank, which does not exceed the number of transmit or receive
antennas, is limited by this number so that the isotropic model of the previous section does not
apply2.
For an omnidirectional eavesdropper, its channel gain is the same in all directions of its active
subspace, i.e.
|H2x|2 = x†W2x = const ∀x ∈ N (W2)⊥ (45)
where N (W2)⊥ is the subspace orthogonal to the nullspace N (W2) of W2, i.e. its active
subspace, whose dimensionality is r2 = rank(W2). In particular, when the eavesdropper is
2This was pointed out by A. Khisti.
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isotropic, N (W2) is empty so that N (W2)⊥ is the entire space and r2 = m. The condition in
(45) implies that
W2 = εU2+U
†
2+ (46)
where U2+ is a semi-unitary matrix whose columns are the active eigenvectors of W2, and
N (W2)⊥ = span{U2+}. Note that the model in (46) allows W2 to be rank-deficient: r2 < m
is allowed. ε can be evaluated from e.g. (25): ε = αn2mR−ν2min.
Theorem 2. Under the omnidirectional eavesdropper setting in (45), (46) and when R(W1) ⊆
R(W2), the MIMO-WTC secrecy capacity can be expressed as follows:
Cs = max
trR≤PT
ln
|I+W1R|
|I+W2R| = maxtrR≤PT ln
|I+W1R|
|I+ ǫR| = C
∗(ǫ) (47)
i.e. the capacity and optimal signaling to achieve it are the same as for the isotropic eavesdropper
as in Proposition 1.
Proof: First note that, for the omnidirectional eavesdropper, W2 ≤ εI so that |I+W2R| ≤
|I+ εR| and hence
Cs = max
trR≤PT
ln
|I+W1R|
|I+W2R| ≥ maxtrR≤PT ln
|I+W1R|
|I+ ǫR| = C
∗(ǫ) (48)
To prove the reverse inequality, let P2 be a projection matrix on R(W2), i.e. P2 = U2+U†2+.
Then, P2WkP2 =Wk, k = 1, 2, so that
C(R) = ln
|I+P2W1P2R|
|I+P2W2P2R| = ln
|I+ W˜1R˜|
|I+ εR˜| = C˜(R˜) (49)
where R˜ = U†2+RU2+ and likewise for W˜k, so that W˜2 = εI, where we used |I + AB| =
|I+BA|. Further note that
tr R˜ = trU†2+RU2+ (50)
=
∑
i
λi(R)|u†2iuRi|2 (51)
≤
∑
i
λi(R) = trR ≤ PT (52)
where u2i and uRi are i-th eigenvectors of W2 and R, and we have used R =
∑
i λi(R)uRiu
†
Ri
and |u†2iuRi|2 ≤ |u2i|2|uRi|2 = 1. Hence, R˜ satisfies power constraint if R does and thus
Cs = max
trR≤PT
C(R) ≤ max
tr R˜≤PT
C˜(R˜) = max
λi≥0,
∑
i
λi≤PT
∑
i
ln
1 + g˜iλi
1 + ǫλi
= C˜∗(ε) (53)
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where g˜i = λi(W˜1), and C˜∗(ε) is the secrecy capacity under W˜1 and isotropic eavesdropper
W˜2 = εI. Note that
λi(W˜1) = λi(U
†
2+W1U2+) = λi([U
†
2W1U2]r2×r2) ≤ λi(U†2W1U2) = λi(W1) (54)
where [A]k×k denotes k × k principal sub-matrix of A, r2 = rank(W2), and U2 is a unitary
matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of W2. The inequality is due to Cauchy eigenvalue
interlacing theorem [21] and the last equality is due to the fact that U2W1U†2 and W1 have the
same eigenvalues. Based on this, one obtains:
Cs ≤ C˜∗(ε) ≤ max
λi≥0,
∑
i
λi≤PT
∑
i
ln
1 + giλi
1 + ǫλi
= C∗(ε) (55)
thus establishing Cs = C∗(ε) under an omnidirectional eavesdropper with R(W1) ⊆ R(W2).
Note that the secrecy capacity as well as the optimal signaling for the omnidirectional eaves-
dropper in Theorem 2 is the same as those for the isotropic one (which is not the case in general,
as can be shown via examples), i.e. the fact that the rank of the eavesdropper channel is low
has no impact provided that R(W1) ⊆ R(W2) holds.
Since R(W) collects directions where the channel gain is not zero:
|Hx|2 = x†Wx 6= 0 ∀x ∈ R(W) (56)
the condition R(W1) ⊆ R(W2) means that |H2x| = 0 implies |H1x| = 0 (but the converse is
not true in general) and hence |H1x| 6= 0 implies |H2x| 6= 0, i.e. the eavesdropper can ”see” in
any direction where the receiver can ”see” (but there is no requirement here for the eavesdropper
to be degraded with respect to the receiver so that the channel is not necessarily degraded).
Further note that the condition in (45) does not require U2 = U1, i.e. the eigenvectors of the
legitimate channel and of the eavesdropper can be different.
VI. IDENTICAL RIGHT SINGULAR VECTORS
In this section, we consider the case when H1,2 have the same right singular vectors (SV), so
that their singular value decomposition takes the following form:
Hk = UkΣkV
† (57)
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where the unitary matrices Uk,V collect left and right singular vectors respectively and diagonal
matrix Σk collects singular values of Hk. In this model, the left singular vectors can be arbitrary.
This is motivated by the fact that right singular vectors are determined by scattering around the
Tx while left ones - by scattering around the Rx and eavesdropper respectively. Therefore,
when the Rx and eavesdropper are spatially separated, their scattering environments may differ
significantly (and hence different left SVs) while the same scattering environment around the
Tx induces the same right SVs. We make no weak eavesdropper or other assumptions here.
After unitary (and thus information-preserving) transformations, this scenario can be put into
the parallel channel setting of [19][20]. The secrecy capacity and the optimal covariance in this
case can be explicitly characterized as follows.
Proposition 3. Consider the wiretap MIMO channel as in (2), (57). The optimal Tx covariance
for this channel takes the following form:
R∗ = VΛ∗V† (58)
where the diagonal matrix Λ∗ collects its eigenvalues λ∗i :
λ∗i =
λ2i + λ1i
2λ2iλ1i
(√
1 +
4λ2iλ1i
(λ2i + λ1i)2
(
λ1i − λ2i
λ
− 1
)
+
− 1
)
(59)
and where λki = σ2ki and σki denotes singular values of Hk; λ > 0 is found from the total power
constraint:
∑
i λ
∗
i = PT .
Proof: Under (57), Wk = VΛkV†, where diagonal matrix Λk = Σ†kΣk collects eigenvalues
of Wk, so that the problem in (4) can be re-formulated as
Cs = max
tr R˜≥0
ln
|I+Λ1R˜|
|I+Λ2R˜|
s.t. tr R˜ ≤ PT (60)
where R˜ = V†RV. However, this is the secrecy capacity of a set of parallel Gaussian wire-
tap channels as in [19][20], for which independent signaling is known to be optimal3, so that
maximizing R˜∗ is diagonal, from which (58) follows. The optimal power allocation in (59) is
essentially the same as for the equivalent parallel channels in [20].
3The authors would like to thank A. Khisti for pointing out this line of argument.
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In fact, Eq. (58) says that optimal signaling is on the right SVs of H1,2 and (59) implies that
only those eigenmodes are active for which
σ21i > σ
2
2i + λ (61)
If λ2i = 0, then (59) reduces to
λ∗i =
(
1
λ
− 1
λ1i
)
+
(62)
i.e. as in the standard WF. This implies that when λ2i = 0 for all active eigenmodes, then the
standard WF power allocation is optimal.
It should be stressed that the original channels in (57) are not parallel (diagonal). They become
equivalent to a set of parallel independent channels after performing information-preserving
transformations. Also, there is no assumption of degradedness here and no requirement for the
optimal covariance to be of full rank or rank-1.
VII. WHEN IS ZF SIGNALING OPTIMAL?
In this section, we consider the case when ZF signaling is optimal, i.e. when active eigenmodes
of the optimal covariance R∗ are orthogonal to those of W2: W2R∗ = 04. It is clear that this
does not hold in general. However, the importance of this scenario is coming from the fact that
such signaling does not require wiretap codes: since the eavesdropper gets no signal, regular
coding on the required channel suffices. Hence, the system design follows the well-established
standard framework and secrecy requirement imposes no extra complexity penalty but is rather
ensured by the well-established ZF signaling.
Proposition 4. A sufficient condition for Gaussian ZF signaling being optimal for the Gaussian
MIMO-WTC in (2) is that W1 and W2 have the same eigenvectors or, equivalently, H1 and H2
have the same right singular vectors as in (57), and
λ1i ≤ λ2i + λ if λ2i > 0, (63)
4This simply means that the Tx antenna array puts null in the direction of eavesdropper, which is known as null forming
in antenna array literature [16]. This can also be considered as a special case of interference alignment, so that Proposition 4
establishes its optimality.
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where λ is found from the total power constraint ∑i λ∗i = PT , and
λ∗i = λi(R
∗) =
(
1
λ
− 1
λ1i
)
+
if λ2i = 0, (64)
and 0 otherwise. The optimal covariance is as in (58) so that its eigenvectors are those of W1
and W2.
A necessary condition of ZF optimality is that the active eigenvectors of R∗ are also the active
eigenvectors of W1 and the inactive eigenvectors of W2, and that the power allocation is given
by (64).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 4. The optimal power allocation in (64) is the same as standard water filling. However,
a subtle difference here is the condition for an eigenmode to be active, λ∗i > 0: while the standard
WF requires λ1i > λ, the solution above requires in addition λ2i = 0, so that the set of active
eigenmodes is generally smaller: the larger the set of eavesdropper positive eigenmodes, the
smaller the set of active eigenmodes.
It is gratifying to see that the standard WF over the eigenmodes of the required channel is
optimal if ZF is optimal. In a sense, the optimal transmission strategy in this case is separated
into two independent parts: part 1 ensures that the eavesdropper gets no signal (via the ZF) and
part 2 is the standard eigenmode signaling and WF on what remains of the required channel as
if the eavesdropper were not there. No new wiretap codes need to be designed.
VIII. WHEN IS THE STANDARD WATER FILLING OPTIMAL?
Motivated by the fact that the transmitter may be unaware about the presence of an eavesdrop-
per and hence uses the standard transmission on the eigenmodes of W1 with power allocated
via the water-filling (WF) algorithm, we ask the question: is it possible for this strategy to be
optimal for the MIMO-WTC? The affirmative answer and conditions for this to happen are given
below. To this end, let RWF be the optimal Tx covariance matrix for transmission on W1 only,
which is given by the standard water-filling over the eigenmodes of W1:
RWF = U1Λ
∗U
†
1, λ
∗
i =
{
λ−1 − λ−11i
}
+
(65)
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where Λ∗ = diag{λ∗i} is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of RWF , and λ is found from the
total power constrain
∑
i λ
∗
i = PT .
Theorem 3. The standard WF Tx covariance matrix in (65) is also optimal for the Gaussian
MIMO-WTC if:
1) the eigenvectors of W1 and W2 are the same: U1 = U2;
2) for active eigenmodes λ∗i > 0, their eigenvalues λ1i and λ2i are related as follows:
λ2i =
λ1i
1 + αλ1i
< λ1i, for some α > 0, (66)
or, equivalently, λ−12i = λ−11i + α;
3) for inactive eigenmodes λ∗i = 0, the eigenvalues λ1i and λ2i are related either as in (66)
or λ1i ≤ λ2i.
Proof: We assume that W1 and W2 are non-singular; the singular case will be considered
below (using a standard continuity argument). The KKT conditions for the optimal covariance
R = RWF , which are necessary for optimality in (4), can be expressed as:
(W−11 +R)
−1 − (W−12 +R)−1 = λ′I−M (67)
λ′(trR− PT ) = 0, MR = 0 (68)
λ′ ≥ 0, M,R ≥ 0, trR ≤ PT (69)
whereM ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier matrix responsible for the constraintR ≥ 0 while λ′ ≥ 0
is the Lagrange multiplier responsible for the total power constraint trR ≤ PT . Multiplying both
sides of (67) by U†1 on the left and by U1 on the right, one obtains:
(Λ−11 +Λ
∗)−1 − (Λ−12 +Λ∗)−1 = λ′I−U†1MU1 = λ′I−ΛM (70)
where Λ1,Λ2,ΛM are diagonal matrices of eigenvalues ofW1,W2,M. The last equality follows
from the fact that all terms but U†1MU1 are diagonal so that the last term has to be diagonal
too: U†1MU1 = ΛM , i.e. M has the same eigenvectors as W1,W2,R. The complementary
slackness in (68) implies that λ∗iλMi = 0, where λMi is i-th eigenvalue of M, i.e. if λ∗i > 0
(active eigenmode) then λMi = 0 so that, after some manipulations, (70) can be expressed as
λ∗i =
1
(λ−12i + λ
∗
i )
−1 + λ′
− 1
λ1i
= λ−1 − λ−11i
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for each λ∗i > 0, where the 2nd equality follows from (65). Therefore, λ = (λ−12i + λ∗i )−1 + λ′
and hence
λ∗i = (λ− λ′)−1 − λ−12i = λ−1 − λ−11i (71)
so that λ−12i = λ−11i + α with α = (λ− λ′)−1 − λ−1 > 0 satisfies both equalities in (71).
For inactive eigenmodes λ∗i = 0, it follows from (70) that
λ1i − λ2i = λ′ − λMi ≤ λ′ (72)
Observe that this inequality is satisfied when λ1i ≤ λ2i (since λ′ > 0). To see that it also holds
under (66), observe that
λ1i − λ2i = αλ
2
1i
1 + αλ1i
≤ αλ
2
1 + αλ
= λ′ (73)
where the inequality is due to λ1i ≤ λ (which holds for inactive eigenmodes) and the fact that
αλ2
1i
1+αλ1i
is increasing in λ1i. Thus, one can always select λMi ≥ 0 to satisfy (72) and hence the
KKT conditions in (67)-(69) have a unique solution which also satisfies (65). This proves the
optimality of RWF .
If W1 or/and W2 are singular, one can use a standard continuity argument: observe that Cs
is a continuous function of W1 and W2 (which follows from the continuity of C(R) and the
compactness of the constraint set {R : R ≥ 0, trR ≤ PT}, which is closed and bounded) and
that the conditions 1-3 of Theorem 3 are also continuous. Hence, one can consider Wkδ =
Wk + δI > 0, where δ > 0 and k = 1, 2, instead of Wk, apply Theorem 3 and then take the
limit δ → 0 to establish the result for the singular case.
Note that the conditions of Theorem 3 do not require W1 = aW2 for some scalar a > 1;
they also allow for the WTC to be non-degraded. However, the condition in (66) implies that
larger λ1i corresponds to larger λ2i, so that, over the active signaling subspace, the channel is
degraded.
The 1st condition in Theorem 3 implies that H1 and H2 have the same right singular vectors
but imposes no constraints on their left singular vectors. This may represent a scenario where
the transmitter is a basestation where the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper experience the
same scattering while having their own individual scatterers around their own receivers (which
determine the left singular vectors), as in Section VI.
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IX. WHEN IS ISOTROPIC SIGNALING OPTIMAL?
In the regular MIMO channel (W2 = 0), the isotropic signaling (IS) is optimal (R∗ = aI)
iff W1 = bI, i.e. W1 has identical eigenvalues. Since this transmission strategy is appealing
due to its low complexity (all antennas send independent data streams, no precoding, no Tx CSI
and thus no feedback is required), we consider the isotropic signaling over the wire-tap MIMO
channel and characterize the set of channels on which it is optimal. It turns out to be much
richer than that of the regular MIMO channel.
Proposition 5. Consider the MIMO wire-tap channel in (2). The isotropic signaling is optimal,
i.e. R∗ = aI in (4), for the set of channels {W1,W2} that satisfy all of the following:
1. W1 and W2 have the same (otherwise arbitrary) eigenvectors, U1 = U2.
2. W1 >W2 so that λi(W1) = a−1i > λi(W2) = b−1i , where λi(W) are ordered eigenvalues
of W.
3. Take any b1 > 0 and a1 < b1 and set λ = (a1 + a)−1 − (b1 + a)−1 > 0,
4. For i = 2...m, take any bi such that bi > λa2(1− λa)−1 > 0, and set
ai = −a+ (λ+ (bi + a)−1)−1 > 0 (74)
This gives the complete characterization of the set of channels for which isotropic signaling
is optimal.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that any channel in the given set satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 2 in [6] and the corresponding optimal covariance is isotropic, which proves the
sufficiency. The converse (necessity) follows from Theorem 1 in [6], which requires W1 >W2,
so that the optimization problem is strictly convex and thus has a unique solution. For isotropic
signaling to be optimal, the corresponding KKT conditions (see the proofs of Theorems 1 and
2 in [6]) imply the conditions stated above.
Note that the special case of this Proposition is when W1 and W2 have identical eigenvalues,
as in the case of the regular MIMO channel, but, unlike the regular channel, there is also a
large set of channels with distinct eigenvalues which dictates the isotropic signaling as well.
It is the interplay between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper that is responsible for this
phenomenon, i.e. a non-isotropic nature of the 1st channel is compensated for by a carefully-
adjusted non-isotropy of the 2nd one.
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TABLE I
THE CONDITIONS OF OPTIMALITY OF THE ZF, THE WF AND THE IS IN THE GAUSSIAN MIMO-WTC
Strategy Optimality conditions
WF U1 = U2; λ1i, λ2i as in Theorem 3
ZF U1 = U2; λ1i, λ2i as in Proposition 4
IS U1 = U2; λ1i, λ2i as in Proposition 5
Table 1 summarizes the conditions for the optimality of the ZF, the WF and the IS in the
Gaussian MIMO-WTC. Clearly, the requirement for W1 and W2 to have the same eigenvectors
is the key condition. It is satisfied when the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are subject
to the same scattering around the base station (the transmitter) while they may have their own
sets of scatterers around their own units.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Applying the inequalities
x− x2/2 ≤ ln(1 + x) ≤ x (75)
which hold for any x ≥ 0, to
ln |I+W2R| =
∑
i
ln(1 + λi(W2R)) (76)
one obtains:
Cw(R) ≤ C(R) ≤ Cw(R) + 1
2
∑
i
λ2i (W2R) (77)
from which the 1st inequality in (7) follows by using R = R∗w; the 2nd inequality follows from
the fact that C(R) is maximized by R∗: Cs = C(R∗) ≥ C(R∗w). To obtain the last inequality,
we need the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let λi ≥ 0 and
∑
i λi ≤ PT . Then,∑
i
λ2i ≤ P 2T (78)
Proof: Since λi ≥ 0, ∑
i
λ2i ≤
(∑
i
λi
)2
≤ P 2T (79)
Using this Lemma and observing that λi(W2R) ≤ λ1(W2)λi(R) (see e.g. [21]), one obtains:∑
i
λ2i (W2R) ≤ λ21(W2)
∑
i
λ2i (R) ≤ λ21(W2)P 2T (80)
since
∑
i λi(R) ≤ PT , so that
Cs = C(R
∗) ≤ Cw(R∗) + λ21(W2)P 2T/2 ≤ Cw + λ21(W2)P 2T/2 (81)
since Cw = Cw(R∗w) ≥ Cw(R∗), which establishes the last inequality in (7).
To establish the closed form solution for Cw in (12), consider the optimization problem in
(5), for which the Lagrangian is
L = ln |I+W1R| − tr(W2R)− λ(trR− PT ) + tr(MR) (82)
where λ ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier responsible for the total power constraint and M ≥ 0
is a matrix Lagrange multiplier responsible for the constraint R ≥ 0. The corresponding KKT
conditions (see e.g. [18] for a background on these conditions) are:
∂L/∂R = (I+W1R)
−1W1 −W2 − λI+M = 0 (83)
λ(trR− PT ) = 0,MR = 0 (84)
λ ≥ 0,M,R ≥ 0 (85)
Since the objective is concave, the corresponding optimization problem is convex, and since
Slater condition holds (e.g. take R = PT I/2 > 0, trR < PT ), the KKT conditions are sufficient
for optimality [18]. After some manipulations, (83) can be transformed to
R̂− (I− M̂)−1 = −Ŵ−11 (86)
R̂ =W
1/2
λ RW
1/2
λ , M̂ =W
−1/2
λ MW
−1/2
λ , Ŵ1 =W
−1/2
λ W1W
−1/2
λ (87)
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where we implicity assume that W1 and Wλ are non-singular, so that Q =W−1λ ; the singular
case will be considered below. Since M̂R̂ = 0 (which follows from MR = 0), these matrices
commute and thus have the same eigenvectors, which, from (86), implies that these eigenvectors
are the same as those of Ŵ1. Hence, all three matrices can be simultaneously diagonalized
and thus (86) can be transformed to diagonal form where the diagonal entries are respective
eigenvalues:
λi(R̂)− (1− λi(M̂))−1 = −λ−1i (Ŵ1) (88)
From this and complementary slackness M̂R̂ = 0, which implies λi(M̂) = 0 if λi(R̂) > 0 (i.e.
for active eigenmodes),
λi(R̂) = (1− λ−1i (Ŵ1))+ (89)
so that R̂ = (I− Ŵ−11 )+ from which (8) follows. Lagrange multiplier λ is found from the total
power constraint trR ≤ PT .
The existence of the threshold power P ∗T follows from the fact that trR∗ is monotonically
decreasing in λ so that its largest value corresponds to λ→ 0 and equals P ∗T . When PT > P ∗T ,
λ = 0 and trR∗ = P ∗T < PT , i.e. only partial power is used (see Fig. 1 for illustration and
discussion). The fact that P ∗T =∞ if W2 is singular and N (W2) * N (W1) can be established
via a limiting transition: consider W2δ = W2 + δI > 0 instead of W2, where δ > 0, evaluate
P ∗T (δ) and take the limit limδ→0 P ∗T (δ) (P ∗T = ∞ corresponds to the fact that one can always
use extra power to transmit on the directions in N (W2) for which there is no leakage to the
eavesdropper but positive rate to the legitimate receiver). If N (W2) ⊆ N (W1), one can project
both matrices orthogonaly to the subspace N (W2) without affecting the system performance,
and perform the analysis on the projected matrices (of which the projected W2 is non-singular).
If Wλ is singular, it follows from (83) that λ = 0 (inactive total power constraint) and W1
is singular as well and, furthermore, N (W2) ⊆ N (W1) so that both matrices can be projected,
without affecting the performance, on the subspace orthogonal to N (W2), the analysis can be
carried out for the projected matrices (where the projected W2 is non-singular), and the resulting
covariance can be transformed back to the original space. This is equivalent to using the (Moore-
Penrose) pseudo-inverse Q of Wλ instead the inverse in (8) and (9). This approach can also be
used to compute the threshold power P ∗T if W2 is singular and N (W2) ⊆ N (W1). The case
of singular W1 is also addressed in Remark 1.
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Finally, (12) is obtained by using (8) in (5).
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The 1st equality in (28) follows from (4). The 2nd equality follows from the Hadamard
inequality applied to |I +W1R| in the same way as for the regular MIMO channel, and the
equality is achieved when R has the same eigenvectors asW1, R∗ = U1Λ∗U†1, which maximizes
the numerator and leaves the denominator unchanged. The remaining part is the optimal power
allocation in (29), which can be formulated as
C∗(ǫ) = max
{λi}
∑
i
ln
1 + giλi
1 + ǫλi
, s.t. λi ≥ 0,
∑
i
λi = PT (90)
This, however, represents an optimal power allocation for parallel channels which can be found
in [20].
The lower/upper bounds follow from the fact that |I +WR| is a matrix-monotone function
of W [21], so that |I+WbR| ≥ |I+WaR| ∀ Wb ≥Wa ≥ 0.
To establish the gap bound in (30), observe the following:
∆C = C∗(ǫm)− C∗(ǫ1) = max
{λi}
∑
i
ln
1 + giλi
1 + ǫmλi
−max
{λi}
∑
i
ln
1 + giλi
1 + ǫ1λi
(91)
≤ max
{λi}
∑
i:gi>ǫm
ln
1 + ǫ1λi
1 + ǫmλi
(92)
= m+ ln
1 + ǫ1PT/m+
1 + ǫmPT/m+
(93)
≤ m+ ln ǫ1
ǫm
(94)
where maximization is over the set of positive {λi} satisfying the power constraint
∑
i λi ≤ PT ,
and m+ is the number of active eigenmodes. (92) follows from (easy to verify) fact that
max
x
f(x)−max
x
g(x) ≤ max
x
{f(x)− g(x)} (95)
and the observation that the 1st maximization in (91) requires gi > ǫm for any λi > 0 so
that imposing the same condition on the 2nd maximization results in an upper bound. To show
(93), observe that the sum in (92) is permutation-symmetric, i.e. has the same value for λ =
[λ1, ..., λm+] and any of its permutation πk{λ}, where πk denotes a permutation. Let F (λ) be
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this sum and observe further that it is concave in λ (since each term is), so that
F (λ) =
1
m+!
∑
k
F (πk{λ}) ≤ F
(
1
m+!
∑
k
πk{λ}
)
≤ F
({
PT
m+
})
(96)
where {PT/m+} is a vector with all entries equal to PT/m+. The 1st equality is due to
permutation symmetry, the 1st inequality is due to the concavity of F (λ), and last inequality is
due to the power constraint and the fact that F (λ) is increasing in each λi. Since this holds for
each λ (including optimal one), (93) follows. (94) follows from the fact that (93) is monotonically
increasing in PT .
C. Proof of Proposition 4
The original problem in (4) is not convex in general. However, since the objective is contin-
uous, the feasible set is compact and Slater condition holds, KKT conditions are necessary for
optimality [22]. They take on the following form (see e.g. [6]):
λW1R =W1 −W2 +M− λI (97)
λ(trR− PT ) = 0, MR = 0 (98)
λ ≥ 0, M,R ≥ 0, trR ≤ PT (99)
where M ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier matrix responsible for the constraint R ≥ 0 while
λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier responsible for the total power constraint trR ≤ PT , and we
used the orthogonality condition W2R = 0.
To prove sufficiency, note from Proposition 3 that if W1,W2 have the same eigenvectors so
is R and hence M and also the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality (since they have a
unique solution). Hence, (97) can be transformed to a diagonal form:
λλ1iλi = λ1i − λ2i + λMi − λ (100)
where λi, λMi are the eigenvalues of R,M. Complementary slackness in (98) gives λiλMi = 0
so that λi > 0 (active eigenmodes) implies λMi = 0 and hence
λi =
λ1i − λ2i − λ
λλ1i
=
1
λ
− 1
λ1i
(101)
where the 2nd equality follows from the orthogonality condition λ2iλi = 0. For inactive eigen-
modes λi = 0, one obtains λMi = λ− λ1i + λ2i ≥ 0 so that λ1i ≤ λ+ λ2i.
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To prove the necessary part, note that complementary slackness RM = 0 implies that RM =
MR and hence R,M have the same eigenvectors so that the eigenvalue decompositions are:
R = UΛU†,M = UΛMU
†
, where diagonal matrices Λ,ΛM collect respective eigenvalues, and
the columns of unitary matrix U are the eigenvectors. Multiplying (97) by U† from the left and
by U from the right, one obtains, after some manipulations,
λI−ΛM = W˜1(I− λΛ)− W˜2 (102)
where W˜k = U†WkU. Using the orthogonality condition RW2 = W2R = 0, which imply
W˜2Λ = 0, and block-partitioned representation of Λ,W˜2, one obtains:
W˜2Λ =
 A11 A12
A21 A22

︸ ︷︷ ︸
W˜2
 Λr 0
0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
=
 A11Λr 0
A21Λr 0
 = 0 (103)
where diagonal matrix Λr > 0 collects positive eigenvalues of R, so that A11 = 0,A21 = A†12 =
0 and hence W˜2 is block-diagonal: W˜2 = diag{0,A22}. This proves that active eigenvectors of
R are also inactive eigenvectors of W2. Complementary slackness RM = 0 implies ΛΛM = 0
so that ΛM is also block-diagonal: ΛM = diag{0,ΛM(m−r)}. Using these representations in
(102) and block-partitioned representation of W˜1,
W˜1 =
 B11 B12
B21 B22
 (104)
one obtains
λI−ΛM =
 B11 B12
B21 B22
 Ir − λΛr 0
0 Im−r
+
 0 0
0 A22

=
 B11(Ir − λΛr) B12
B21(Ir − λΛr) B22 +A22
 (105)
so that B12 = B†21 = 0 and B11 > 0 is diagonal. This proves that the active eigenvectors of R
are also active eigenvectors of W1 (note however that W1 can have more active eigenvectors
than R but the converse is not true). No definite statements can be made at this point about
inactive eigenvectors of W1 and active eigenvectors of W2, e.g. they do not have to be equal.
The upper left block in (105) implies (64).
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